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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by a limited partnership and all of the 
limited partners to get an accounting from the general partner, who had pre-
viously resigned, and for damages against the general partner and its president 
for breach of its fiduciary relationship in carrying out the business of the 
partnership and for a determination of the contract rights involving the 
limited partnership's property, 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY THE LOWER COURT 
Prior to trial, upon motion of the plaintiff-appellants for Partial 
Summary Judgment, the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby granted judgment in favor of 
the plaintiffs against the defendants, Richtron, Inc. and Paul H. Richins, 
declaring that the general partner, Richtron, Inc., had no interest in the 
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Case No. 19902 
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limited partnership's properties. Thereafter, Judge Cornaby, on an ex parte 
letter of the dismissed defendants, ruled that a previous payment paid by the 
general partner and its president into the Court of $10,431, which represented 
the 1980 payment on a real estate contract which was the contract covering 
the purchase of the limited partnership's property, should be awarded to Leo 
H. Richins, who was not a party to the action but was the defendant Paul H. 
RichinsT father, subject to the defendants Richtron, Inc. and Paul H. Richins 
dismissing their appeal of the Partial Summary Judgment. 
After the Judge's ex par te ru l ing , upon motion of p l a i n t i f f s , the 
Court granted p l a i n t i f f s a r igh t to an evidenciary hearing. After the eviden-
ciary hearing the Court reaffirmed i t s previous decision, rendering Findings 
of Fact and Ruling, granting to Leo H. Richins the $10,431, subject to p l a i n t i f f s ' 
appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiffs seek a reversal of the decision of the lower court 
and a determination that the monies paid on the 1980 payment belong to the 
plaintiff-appellants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
An action was commenced in the Second Judicial District Court in 
Davis County on the 10th day of March, 1981. The action was commenced in the 
name of Young Farms Limited, a limited partnership, and all of the limited 
partners against Richtron, Inc., a Utah corporation, its general partner and 
its president. 
On the 2nd day of January, 1981 (see Exhibit E) the general 
partner withdrew from the management of the limited partnership. The limited 
partners met and decided to continue the limited partnership in order to pro-
tect their investment as payments had not been made on the underlying obliga-
tions against the limited partnership properties, which consisted of farm land 
in Duchesne County. 
The limited partnership properties were purchased by the limited 
partnership from the general partner on the 15th day of November, 1974 (see 
Exhibit B) under a real estate contract dated the 15th day of November, 1974, 
which properties had been^ purchased by the general partner on the same day 
under a real estate contract (see Exhibit A). 
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On the 14th day of February, 1979, the general partner put itself 
in the place of the sellers under their real estate contract in connection 
with the underlying sale and assumed the seller's Promissory Note in the 
amount of $95,000 (see Exhibit C). Payments under the contract were to be made 
on the 15th day of November of each year. 
There was also an underlying mortgage against the property in 
favor of Equitable Life Insurance Company (Tr. 21, Testimony of Paul H. Richins). 
The general partner, as of the date of his withdrawal, had not paid 
the underlying obligations either to the mortgage company or to the original 
seller (Allreds) of the partnership properties. 
The general partner received, on behalf of the limited partnership, 
a payment in the amount of approximately $52,000 on November 30, 1980 (Tr. 39-43). 
The payment to the Allreds was tendered to the Bank of Utah, the escrow holder, 
on February 20, 1981 (see Exhibit D). This payment of $10,431 was the payment 
due under the real estate contract between the general partner and the Allreds. 
The Allreds refused the payment as being"late. 
On December 4, 1981 the defendant Richtron, Inc. and an entity 
known as Frontier Investments withdrew the 1980 payment in the amount of $10,431 
from the escrow at the Bank of Utah and tendered that amount, pursuant to Section 
78-27-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953 As Amended (see Exhibit F), and the Bank issued 
its check dated December 7, 1981 to Richtron, Inc. and Frontier Investment in 
the amount of $10,431. 
On December 17, 1981 Judge J. Duffy Palmer heard defendants' Motion 
for Continuance on plaintiffs1 Motion for an Injunction and Motion for an Order 
Compelling Discovery and Motion for Writ of Replevin which was filed on the 9th 
day of December, 1981. 
On December 21, 1981 Judge Palmer ordered that all parties to the 
proceedings were temporarily restrained from any actions, transactions or con-
duct affecting or relating to the property at issue in this action pending hearing 
on plaintiffs' motions, providing that any party may pay or satisfy underlying 
liens and interests of persons or entities having claims against the property 
(R. 100 and 101). 
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On the 6th day of January, 1982, after plaintiffs had been 
informed of the withdrawal by defendants of the 1980 payment, they filed 
a Motion to require the defendants to deposit the 1980 payment in the Court 
(see R. 113). In defendants1 argument against plaintiffs1 motion (R. 150) 
defendants argued that the tender is the equivalent of payment'in actual cash 
and, further, that lfRichtronfs actions were justified, in good faith and legal 
pursuant to UCA Section 78-27-1. At all times material hereto Richtron had 
and now has the ability to produce the actual money11, when, in actuality the 
defendant Richtron did not have the money to pay the 1980 payment (Tr. 69 and 
70), and in fact the funds that were necessary to pay the 1980 payment were 
not taken from the funds advanced by the Limited Partnership but $9,310 of it 
was borrowed from Paul Richins1 parents, Lucille and Leo H«, Richins (Tr. 22) 
and Leo and Lucille Richins received an interest in a contract to secure their 
payment (Tr. 79, Testimony of Leo Richins). 
On the 16th day of February, 1982 the Court ordered the defendants 
to deposit into the Court the $10,431 which represented the 1980 payment on the 
Allred contract and the plaintiffs were ordered to deposit in the Court the sum 
of $10,431 which represented the 1981 Allred contract payment. The funds when 
deposited were to be placed in interest-bearing certificates and held pending 
determination of the rights of the parties in the Allred contract and the 
properties underlying the said contract. Further, the plaintiffs were directed to 
amend the complaint to bring into the action the Allreds, being the sellers of 
the property for which the payments were in controversy (R. 234), after which 
time plaintiff amended their complaint, bringing in the Allreds, seeking a 
determination of the contract rights against the Allreds (R. 236). The plaintiffs 
provided documentation in regard to the payment of the underlying obligations 
on the 3rd day of March, 1982 (R. 268), being the mortgage with the Equitable 
Life Insurance Society of the United Stdtes, which was in default, and the 
payment of the Robert Young and Betty Jean Young equity interest, who were the 
sellers to the general partner (see Exhibit A). 
Defendants answered the complaint and crossclaimed against the 
Allreds (R.274) and alleged that the plaintiffs were improper parties to 
bring the action. 
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The plaintiffs deposited the $10,431 representing the 1981 
payment on the Allred contract, the defendants deposited an irrevocable 
Letter of Credit, dated March 15, 1982, drawn on the Barnes Banking Company 
(R. 288-89)• The Letter of Credit did not provide for any interest and provided 
for an expiration date of September, 1982, with an automatic extension of six 
months. 
On the 20th day of May, 1982 the plaintiffs' attorney moved that 
the money previously ordered to be deposited be deposited, and defendants1 
counsel was ordered to put the money into the Court (R. 317). 
On the 17th day of November, 1982 defendant made a Motion to 
require the payment under the Letter of Credit (R. 343) and, after argument by 
defendants' counsel that the Letter of Credit was the same as cash as required 
by the original order, the Court ordered that the current Letter of Credit be 
amended to provide for the payment of interest that would be provided from 
money market certificates from the date of the original order until the money 
had been deposited in Court or the Letter of Credit levied upon by the Court, 
and that the Letter of Credit was to be open ended (R. 359-360). 
Upon defendants' failure to comply with the Court's order to 
amend the Letter of Credit, plaintiffs moved for an order to require payment 
of the Letter of Credit on the 12th day of April, 1983 (R. 413), and Judge 
Cornaby, on the 2nd day of May, 1983 (R. 444), provided that Richtron pay 
the $10,431 to the Clerk of the Court and if payment was not made within 
thirty days the Letter of Credit would be drawn upon. The cash was not 
supplied and on the 9th day of June, 1983 (R. 453) the Court ordered the 
Clerk of the Court to collect from the Barnes Banking Company the amount due 
under their Letter of Credit. 
On the 30th day of September, 1983 plaintiffs moved for a Partial 
Summary Judgment against the general partner, Richtron, Inc. and its president 
(R. 491), which motion was heard by Judge Cornaby on the 1st day of November, 
1983 and was granted (R. 584). At that time both the defendants, Richtron, Inc. 
and the general partner and its president, Paul H. Richins, were dismissed and 
it was determined that the general partner had no right, title, interest or 
claim to or in the real property which was the subject matter of the suit and 
which was all of the property of the limited partnership. 
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Prior to that ruling, Paul Richins had filed an Affidavit (R. 521) 
making his argument that Richtron, Inc. was the only general partner that could 
represent the limited partnership, that the Court had previously ruled in the 
Blackfoot Farms case that Richtron, Inc. was to be the sole liquidating general 
partner (R. 543-47). Also included in Mr. Richins1 Affidavit was the complete 
Amended Articles of Limited Partnership made the 12th day of February, 1981 and 
filed in the County ClerkTs office on July 1, 1981, which shows the addition 
of Tower Real Estate, a Utah corporation, as the new general partner, which 
Articles were signed by all of the limited partners and the new general partner 
(R. 551-582). 
After the dismissal of the defendants Richtron, Inc. and Paul H. 
Richins, those defendants appealed the Partial Summary Judgment pro se, although 
Paul H. Richins would not be able to represent Richtron, Inc. pro se (R. 593-98). 
On December 7, 1983 Paul Richins wrote to Judge Palmer requesting 
a return of the $10,431 representing the 1980 Allred payment. The letter was 
referred by Judge Palmer to Judge Cornaby who ruled ex parte that if the 
defendants dismissed the appeal it would be proper to return the $10,431 to 
Leo Richins. As long as the appeal remained in process the amount should remain 
with the Clerk of the Court (R. 606). Plaintiffs moved to amend Judge Cornabyfs 
ruling on their request for refund (R. 609). This motion was denied and the 
ruling was left in tact (R. 647). Plaintiffs moved for an evidenciary hearing, 
which hearing was held on January 12, 1984 (R. 648). The Judge made Findings 
of Fact and Ruling (R. 662-667). The Judge found that the plaintiffs paid the 
1980 payment to Richtron; that Richtron made its 1980 payment to the Allreds on 
the 20th day of February, 1981 in the amount of $10,431; that the Allreds refused 
the payment; that Paul Richins on behalf of Richtron, Inc. requested the 1980 
payment be returned to him and that the Bank returned the $10,431 to Richtron, 
which $10,431 represented the 1980 payment; that Leo- and Lucille Richins loaned 
to Paul Richins or Richtron $9,310 in order to make it possible for them to make 
the payment on February 20, 1981; that Richtron and Frontier Investment received 
the $10,431 and spent it. The Court further found that Judge Palmer directed 
the defendants to put the 1980 payment into the Court; that instead the defendants 
submitted a Letter of Credit to be drawn on the account of Leo Richins; that 
the Court finally ordered the Letter of Credit be drawn upon, be turned into 
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cash and deposited in the Court. The Court found that the $10,431 represented 
by the Letter of Credit was submitted at the request of Leo H. and Lucille 
Richins on what they considered a personal Letter of Credit for Paul Richins 
and not a loan to Richtron, Inc. or Frontier Investment or any other corpora-
tion; that Leo and Lucille Richins received no consideration for the Letter 
of Credit; that they instructed the Bank to issue the Letter of Credit because 
they trusted their son Paul and because he had requested them to do it and 
they had love for their son Paul and for that reason decided to do it; that 
the Letter of Credit was irrevocable and that the $10,431 represented by the 
Letter of Credit represented the November, 1980 payment to the Allreds. 
The Court then ruled that the $10,431 represented by the Letter 
of Credit and any interest drawn on that amount was owned by Leo and Lucille 
Richins; that it was not owned by the defendant Paul Richins and that Richtron, 
Inc. owes the $10,431 represented by the Letter of Credit since they were the 
entity that received the $10,431 from the Bank. Further, the Court ruled that 
the Letter of Credit was being paid as a loan and the Court isn't sure, even, 
if it is a loan. The Letter of Credit was there to be drawn as if it were a 
loan, if it were ever received by the Court. The Court ruled that the Letter 
of Credit for $10,431 plus interest should go back to the payment source from 
which it came, which was Leo Richins, and further ruled that the $10,431 was 
to remain in the custody of the Clerk until a final determination of the Judgefs 
rulings was determined by the appellate process. 
The plaintiffs and remaining defendants, after dismissing the Bank 
of Utah, entered into a settlement agreement wherein the plaintiffs paid all 
back payments on the contract and had the contracts reinstated (R. 678-686). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE $10,431 
REPRESENTING THE 1980 PAYMENT ON THE ALLRED CONTRACT 
BELONGED TO LEO H. AND LUCILLE RICHINS. 
At no time was Leo or Lucille Richins a party to this action until 
they moved to intervene in the appeal on or about the 4th day of June, 1984. 
It is well established in law that: 
"A judgment can be rendered only for or against a party to 
the action or proceeding and not for or against one not a 
party. The rights and liabilities of persons not parties 
cannot be adjudicated.11 (40 CJS Paragraph 28, p. 68) 
Judge Cornaby, in ruling that the money belonged to Leo H. and 
Lucille Richins exceeded his authority. The Letter of Credit was not placed 
into the Court by Leo H. and Lucille Richins. It was placed in the Court 
by the defendants Richtron, Inc. and its president Paul H. Richins. The only 
connection with the Letter of Credit that Leo and Lucille Richins had was the 
fact that it was to be drawn on their account. It was, therefore, a loan or 
personal arrangement between Leo and Lucille Richins and their son, Paul H. 
Richins, and/or Richtron, Inc., the defendants. 
The lower Court was concerned about the fact that there was no 
consideration given by Paul Richins and/or Richtron, Inc. to Leo H. and Lucille 
Richins. However, the Utah State Code, Section 70A-5-105 1953 As Amended pro-
vides: 
"Consideration. No consideration is necessary to establish 
a credit or to enlarge or otherwise modify its terms." 
This provision is in the section dealing with Letters of Credit 
and does, in fact, establish that a Letter of Credit is the same in nature as 
cash. This being the case, Leo H. and Lucille Richins had no claim to the 
money as it is amply determined by the Court and supported by the facts that 
the $10,431 represented by the Letter of Credit represented the 1980 payment 
on the Allred contract. 
It can also be argued that since the Letter of Credit was drawn 
upon and cash was deposited, that that terminated any interest or claim that 
Leo H. and Lucille Richins might have had against the cash. However, I think 
that the statutory provision is determinative in regard to any question of lack 
of consideration. 
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The Court further ruled that the Letter of Credit was supported by 
love and affection for their son Paul H. Richins. Since the Richins had been 
given a contract interest in properties as security for the original payment of 
$9,310, it could be argued that there was consideration for them to make the second 
payment to protect that interest. Further, the love and affection for their son 
Paul was sufficient consideration. 
The original $10,431 payment made on the 20th day of February, 
1981 by the general partner was paid not from funds provided by the limited 
partnership, which were ample to cover the payment, but were paid by funds 
from his parents so, obviously, the general partner had spent or utilized the 
funds for some purpose other than that for which the payment had been received. 
The general partner not only failed to make the Allred payment, he also failed 
to make the underlying mortgage payment and the limited partnership, in order 
to protect their interest in the properties, not only had to make up the 1980 
payment but had to pay off the mortgage and the intermediary equity position 
by the Youngs. Since the limited partnership had provided the funds to pay 
the November, 1980 payment and the mortgage payment, which funds were not 
utilized for that purpose, and since the limited partnership was required to 
pay the 1980 payment again in order to re-establish the contract with the 
Allreds, it would be patently unfair and unjust to allow the general partner 
and/or its president and/or its president's parents to benefit from the 
breaching of the fiduciary duty to the limited partners and the limited part-
nership to make the payments. 
The $10,431 represented by the irrevocable Letter of Credit repre-
sented the 1980 payment on the Allred contract and should be utilized as such 
and, as this payment has been made by the limited partnership, the $10,431 
and interest accumulated on that amount should be returned to them. 
It is unfortunate that Leo and Lucille Richins, the parents of 
Paul Richins, have paid the 1980 payment twice and it is unfortunate that the 
limited partners have had to make the payment twice. However, the parties in 
this matter are the limited partnership, the limited partners and the general 
partner and its president and the equities lie with the limited partners, the 
party at fault being the general partner and its president, whose parents have 
a legal right to proceed against him or the general partner for a recovery 
of their monies paid to them or provided to them for their benefit. 
-9-
POINT II 
THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AND LIMITED PARTNERS HAVE A RIGHT 
TO BRING THIS ACTION AGAINST THE GENERAL PARTNER AND ITS 
PRESIDENT FOR AN ACCOUNTING AND ARE THE PROPER PARTIES 
TO RECEIVE THE BENEFITS OF THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP PROPERTIES. 
The Court dismissed out of the law suit the defendants Richtron, 
Inc. and its president, Paul H. Richins on plaintiffs1 motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. The defendants thereupon appealed that decision and there-
after withdrew their appeal. 
The question of the right of the limited partnership and/or the 
limited partners to bring the action was an issue in the case, as was defined 
in the pre-trial order dated May 16, 1983 (R. 446). The granting of the 
Partial Summary Judgment against the defendant Richtron, Inc. and its president, 
Paul H. Richins, laid to rest that issue 
The defendant, Paul H. Richins, made all of the arguments in his 
Affidavit to the Court and, at the time of the motion for a Partial Summary 
Judgment that had to do with plaintiffs1 failure to successfully appoint a 
new General Partner, the Court's previous ruling in the Blackfoot case, and 
his position that the defendant Richtron, Inc. could be the only party to 
represent the limited partnership in a liquidating procedure. 
The original limited partnership agreement of Young Farms Limited 
provides in paragraph 6 of Article VI: 
?lThe limited partners have the right by vote of a majority 
to do all or any one of the following acts: 
a. Remove the present general partner and elect a new 
general partner, provided, however, that the exercise 
of such power shall not affect the general partner's 
right to share in partnership proceeds or distributions 
as provided in this Agreement.'1 
All of the limited partners got together and amended the Articles 
of the Limited Partnership Agreement on the 12th day of February, 1981, which 
Amended Articles were filed July 1, 1981 and which Amended Articles provided 
that Tower Real Estate, a Utah corporation, would be the general partner. 
These Amended Articles were signeid by all of the limited partners. 
This action was commenced in March of 1981 by the limited partner-
ship and by all of the limited partners. It was answered by Mr. David Leta, 
representing the defendants Richtron, Inc. and Paul H. Richins, that the 
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Blackfoot Farms case was filed in November, 1981 by an attorney who had no 
right to represent Young Farms Limited, Mr. James Brown, The defendants in 
the Blackfoot Farms action were the same defendants as in this action and 
were represented by the same law firm. Both cases were in the same Court. 
The attorneys for the defendants in the Blackfoot Farms case moved for a 
dismissal on the basis that Mr. Brown had to authority to file the action on 
behalf of the limited partnerships, of which Young Farms Limited was one, and 
used as part of their argument the fact that the current case was pending, which 
action was brought by someone besides Mr. Brown. The Court granted the motion 
to dismiss the action on the basis of lack of authority to file and made Findings 
of Fact that adversely affected Young Farms Limited and its limited partners and 
its new general partner. The counsel for the defendants was aware of the Young 
Farms case; that Young Farms Limited was not a proper party as they argued and 
that Mr. Brown had no authority to represent them. Young Farms Limited, its 
general partner and limited partners were not given notice of the Blackfoot 
Farms law suit; no one connected to Young Farms Limited was made a party; the 
new general partner was not made a party; the limited partners were not made 
parties and no one was ever given notice of the action. Mr. Brown filed a 
verified statement of authority in which he admitted he had no authority to 
represent Young Farms Limited in bringing the action. 
These plaintiffs cannot be bound by a decision of the Court 
wherein they are not parties, have never been given notice until after the 
Court rendered its decision, and have never had the opportunity to make an 
appearance therein. 
40 CJS, paragraph 23, p.52 provides: 
"A valid judgment may be rendered against a defendant only 
when he has been given notice and accordingly a judgment 
which is rendered without notice to or service of process 
on the defendant and without his voluntarily appearing is 
generally void for want of jurisdiction." 
46 Am Jur (2) paragraph 18, p. 324 provides: 
"It is a fundamental doctrine of the law that a party to 
be affected by a personal judgment must have a day in 
Court or an opportunity to be heard." 
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This doctrine was reiterated by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Smith vs. Morris 334 Pac. 2nd 567, 8 Utah 2d 359: 
"It is of course an elementary rule of law that there can 
be no judicial action affecting vested rights that is not 
based upon some process or notice whereby the interested 
parties are brought x^ ithin the jurisdiction of the judicial 
tribunal about to render judgment." 
Mr. James T. Anderson, representing a defendant who is not a respon-
dent, a defendant who had previously been dismissed out of the law suit, made 
an appearance and moved to withdraw the appeal, setting forth the Blackfoot 
Farms case and its decision, of which the Young Farms Limited and its limited 
partners are not proper parties. 
Section 48-2-20 Utah Code Annotated 1953 As Amended provides: 
MThe retirement, death or insanity of a general partner dissolves 
the partnership unless the business is conducted by the remaining 
general partners, 
a. under a right so to do stated in the certificate, or 
b. with the consent of all members.'11 
Section 48-2-24 (2) provides: 
"A certificate shall be amended when a person is admitted 
as a general partner.11 
In this case, a new general partner was elected as provided in the 
Limited Partnership agreement and the Utah Code. The defendant Richtron, Inc. 
has argued that since Richtron, Inc. did not sign the Amendment, the Amendment 
is invalid. If, in fact, the Amendment is invalid by reason of any failure 
to comply with the statute, then such failure would render the limited partner-
ship a general partnership and the general partnership would accede to all of 
the rights and properties of the limited partnership. In this action, if there 
was any failure in regard to the Amendment, then the limited partners, all of 
whom are plaintiffs and appellants in this action, would have all of the rights 
and properties of the limited partnership accrue to them and they would be the 
proper parties to bring an action to determine the property rights and the 
accounting against the former general partner who had withdrawn. 
Therefore, Mr. John T. Anderson's entry of appearance for Richtron, 
Inc., who was not a respondent and who had been previously dismissed out of the 
action and whose time for appeal had run, and his notice of or motion for with-
drawal of appeal is not well taken. 
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CONCLUSION 
There is no question but what the $10,431 Letter of Credit that 
was deposited with the Clerk of the Court represented the 1980 payment to the 
Allreds which had previously been withdrawn from the Bank by the defendants. 
The Letter of Credit was deposited by the defendants as a requirement of the 
Court order, and was with the Clerk in lieu of cash. The statute requires 
no consideration for such a transaction and the trial court's finding that 
one was necessary was in error. Even if consideration was necessary, there 
was sufficient consideration for such a deposit as it was a loan by Leo Richins 
to his defendant son, Paul. 
The appellants were required to make the 1980 payment twice and 
should be able to recover the 1980 payment that is being held by the Court 
pending this appeal. 
Mr. John T. Anderson's appearance for the defendant Richtron, Inc. 
is not well taken as Richtron, Inc. was previously dismissed out of the law suit 
and their appeal time from that dismissal has run. His contention that the 
plaintiffs are not proper parties to bring this action is not well taken and 
no further consideration should be given to his motion to withdraw the appeal. 
DATED this "/• day of November, 1984. 
?A^r*^/r/ 
DSEPfi S. ^ NOWLTON 
'Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
845 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
YOUNG FARMS LIMITED, a limited 
partnership, PHILLIP 0. BOYER, 
VIRGIL CONDON, BOYD J. FARR, 
HOMER L. HALE, MARIE M. IRVINE, 
G. KENNETH JOHNSON, KENNETH W. 
JONES, ROBERT C. NEWMAN, TOFFIE 
SAWAYA, RICHARD STOVER, WILLIAM 
TINGEY, JAMES E. WATTS, RALPH M. 
WRIGHT, limited partners, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
-vs-
RICHTRON, INC., a Utah corporation, 
and PAUL H. RICHINS; ARAL WESLEY 
ALLREAD and SARAH ELAINE ALLRED, 
his wife; BANK OF UTAH, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants, 
LEO H. RICHINS, 
Intervening Respondent. 
REPLY TO INTERVENING RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF 
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT 
Intervening respondent, in the last sentence of the first paragraph, 
states that the issue of who was to be the general partner of the Young Farms 
limited partnership was not adjudicated in this case but had been adjudicated 
previously in another case. The record indicates that the defendants filed a 
counter claim in response to the original complaint (R. 18). The first nine 
paragraphs of the counter claim set forth a claim based upon the concept that 
the defendant Richtron, Inc. is the only entity entitled to act as the plaintiff 
Young Farms, Limited general partner. 
The defendants1 answer and cross claim to the plaintiffs1 
Amended Complaint (R. 274) fails to include a counter claim and there is no 
claim that the limited partnership is being improperly represented, although 
on their Fifth Defense the defendants claim lack of standing on behalf of the 
individual plaintiffs. 
At the end of the first pre-trial, defendant's counsel included 
the question of whether or not Richtronrs resignation as a general partner 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
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gave plaintiff the right to substitute as general partner (R. 446). On the 
31st day of October, 1983 the defendant Paul H. Richins submitted an Affidavit 
(R. 521) including all of the arguments and documentation to support the argu-
ments that he makes now in regard to whether or not the plaintiff limited 
partnership can be represented by someone else other than the defendant Richtron, 
Inc. The defendant Paul H. Richins then made a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the basis of the arguments made in his 
Affidavit. This was done on November 1, 1983 (R. 583). Defendant Richin's 
Motion was denied and the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment (R. 584, 585). 
The Court's ruling in regard to defendants Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ajudicates the issue of whether 
or not the plaintiff can be represented by someone other than Richtron, Inc.. 
However, this issue is not one that is material to the appeal by the plaintiffs 
and the intervening respondent Leo Richins• 
Leo Richins contention that the $10,431 that was deposited into 
the Court as the 1980 payment on the real estate contract was deposited on 
behalf of Paul H. Richins likewise doesn't stand up to a perusal of the record. 
The original order requiring the deposit was entered on the 16th day of February, 
1982 and required the defendants to deposit into the Court the sum of $10,431 
which represents the 1980 payment on the Allred contract and the plaintiff was 
to deposit a like sum into the Court, representing the 1981 Allred contract 
payment (R, 234). The minute entry (R. 233) provided that Richtron was to 
put the money in the Davis County Clerk's office. If the defendant Richins 
did not like the way the order was drafted and contended that he had no interest 
in the contract, his counsel should have had the order read that only Richtron 
was required to make the payment. Instead, all other orders dealing with the 
deposit (R. 317, 358, 359, 419, 445 and 453) deal with the Letter of Credit as 
coming from both defendants. In fact, the defendants Motion for an Order 
Setting Aside and Vacating the Order Respecting the Collection of the Letter 
of Credit (R. 459) claims that the order (R. 453) dated June 9, 1983 requiring 
the payment should be set aside and vacated because the defendant Richtron, Inc. 
had filed in bankruptcy and the Court did not have jurisdiction to require the 
defendant Richtron, Inc. to provide the funds. This motion was denied (R- 487). 
The Court granted the plaintiff's Motion for a Partial Summary 
Judgment, dismissing the defendants Richtron, Inc. and Paul H. Richins as 
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defendants and thereafter dealt with the question of the relationship between 
the plaintiffs being the Young Farms limited partnership and the defendants 
Allred being the owners of the limited partnership property. 
The money was deposited in the Court not by Leo Richins but 
was deposited in the Court by the defendants. The fact that the Letter of 
Credit was drawn on the account of Leo Richins has no materiality. The Court 
cannot go in back of the immediate transfer to determine who put up the money 
or for what reasons. The money was put in for the purpose of the 1980 payment. 
The appellants were required to make that payment to the Allreds to keep the 
contract viable (R. 660). The source from which the money came was the 
defendants and not Leo Richins. 
REPLY TO STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In Intervening Respondent's Statement of Facts, Mr. Richins 
spends a great deal of time on the proposition that Young Farms Limited has 
no authority to bring the action and the appeal. This issue is one between 
the defendant Richtron, Inc. and the plaintiffs and was fully resolved by 
the trial court, appealed from by the defendant Richtron, Inc., and their 
appeal was later withdrawn and is not an issue in this appeal and Mr. Richins 
has no standing to raise these issues on behalf of Richtron, Inc. 
It is interesting that Mr. Richins brings in evidence that is 
not a part of the record and which is immaterial to this case (see footnote 
on p. 8 of Mr. Richins' brief). 
The last part of the last sentence in the finishing paragraph 
number 31 refers to $75,000 that was a liability of Young Farms to Richtron. 
There was no evidence of a liability of Young Farms to Richtron. In fact, as 
pointed out earlier, the defendant Richtron did not file a counter claim against 
the plaintiff Young Farms Limited. 
Mr. Leo Richins spends a great deal of time in his Statement of 
Facts pointing out that he was not a party, was not obligated to make any payments 
in this lawsuit, that he did so on behalf of the defendant Paul H. Richins, his 
son, and that his son had no interest in the property or any obligation to make 
the payment, that he, Leo, had previously paid almost all of the 1980 payment 
that was put into the escrow ($9,310.33 of it), for which he received an interest 
in the contract, and yet he claims that he has an interest in the money paid. 
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1 can't see where it makes any difference if Mr. Leo Richins 
provided the source from which the funds came. The funds were placed into 
the Court for the purpose of being the 1980 contract payment to the Allreds. 
Once the defendants were dismissed out of the lawsuit, the funds should have 
been maintained for that purpose and that purpose alone. 
Mr. Paul Richins was the president of Richtron, Inc. Richtron, 
Inc. had a fiduciary duty to see to it that the payment was made on the contract 
as that money had been paid by the plaintiffs to make that payment. The rela-
tionship between Leo Richins and his son in regard to the payment is immaterial 
and the funds belong to the plaintiffs as they were required to make up the 
payment to the Allreds in order to keep the real estate contract viable for the 
limited partnership. 
ARGUMENTS 
REPLY TO ARGUMENT I 
There is no question but what the Court's order was a final 
order in regard to the 1980 payment and the money involved therein, nor was 
there any necessity for any sworn statement from the plaintiffs in regard 
to their claim for the $10,431. This money was put into the Court as the 
1980 payment on a contract that was being purchased by the plaintiffs. 
They had the possessory right to the property and they had a legal right to 
have the general partner protect their investment interests as the general 
partner was their fiduciary agent in this regard. 
The appeal was not taken until all of the issues were disposed 
of in the case. The issue in regard to the $10,431 was reserved and was 
appealed after the final order of the Court. 
REPLY TO ARGUMENT II 
In response to Mr. Richins' argument that the appellant Young 
Farms has no right to file or maintain this appeal, Mr. Leo Richins is not 
the party that has any interest in this determination. This right would only 
relate to Richtron, Inc. and Mr. Richins is not representing Richtron, Inc. in 
any sense of the word and the defendant Richtron, Inc. has not filed a brief 
as leave was given them to do by this Sourt. 
There is no question that the District Court has the right to 
determine the relationship and rights of the parties and this matter is res 
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judicata; this issue was determined judicially by the lower court and that 
determination was appealed by the defendants Richtron, Inc. and Paul Richins, 
and their appeal was withdrawn (R. 598, 605, 675, 676), and the question of 
appellant Young Farms' right to maintain this appeal is res judicata. 
REPLY TO ARGUMENT III 
It is interesting that Mr. Leo Richins would make this argument 
which basically supports the appellants' position in regard to the Blackfoot 
Farms case. Richtron, Inc. and Paul Richins were parties to this action. 
They were dismissed out of the action. If you follow Mr. Richins' argument 
to its logical conclusion, the monies that were deposited in the Court would 
then belong to the remaining parties, i.e., the plaintiffs and/or defendants 
Allreds, which is exactly the point the plaintiffs are making. 
If Mr. Leo Richins had wanted to be a party, he should have 
made an effort to become one in the District Court. If he thought he had an 
interest in the money, he should have made an effort to protect his interest 
in the District Court. If the defendants had wanted to present arguments and/or 
be heard, they could have done so. The plaintiffs made a motion to reinstate 
Mr. Paul Richins as a party and to try the case as a whole (see pages 4 through 
8 of the transcript). Mr. Richins objected to plaintiffs' motion to reinstate 
the defendants into the action. 
REPLY TO ARGUMENT IV 
Mr. Leo Richins in this argument fails to recognize that what 
the lower court did in this action was conduct an accounting of the rights of 
the parties to the limited partnership's assets and rule that the limited 
partnership's assets belonged to the limited partnership and that the defendants 
Richtron, Inc. and Paul Richins had no interest therein and that, upon payment 
of the outstanding obligations on the contract of sale to the Allreds, that 
contract was reinstated in the name of the Young Farms Limited and not in the 
name of Richtron, Inc. 
This argument is moot as the general partner and its president 
were previously dismissed out of the action and the rights of the parties were 
determined by the Court, appealed from, and their appeal withdrawn. 
-5-
The $10,431 was deposited, without question, for the purpose 
of being the 1980 payment on the real estate contract, which represented the 
real estate which comprised the assets of the limited partnership. Who has 
a better right to the limited partnership assets than the limited partnership 
and its limited partners? The Court makes that determination and the defen-
dants objected to that determination and appealed that ruling and later 
withdrew their appeal. That ought to make the issue moot. 
A review of the record, in particular the final order (R. 678), 
can lead to no other conclusion but that the Court determined the rights of 
the parties in regard to the limited partnership property and made a final 
accounting in regard to that property and the rights of the parties to it. 
REPLY TO ARGUMENT V 
I can't understand how, if Mr. Paul Richins has no liability 
for any of Richtron Inc.'s obligations, he would have been so willing to put 
$10,431 into the Court. He was represented by competent counsel at the time. 
If he objected to the placing of the money into Court, he should have made 
the objection known and/or changed the order. He was certainly aware that 
the purpose for the $10,431 was the 1980 payment which he, as the president 
of Richtron, Incf, withdrew from the escrow account, knowing that there were 
no funds to replace it. 
I fail to see where this argument has any materiality to the 
question of Mr. Leo Richins* right to the money. Mr. Leo Richins didn't put 
the money into the Court, Mr. Paul Richins did. Mr. Leo Richins provided the 
money to his son, Paul Richins, and I don't believe the reasons for his 
providing those funds have any materiality whatsoever as to what those funds 
were to be used for or placed in the Court for. They were placed into the 
Court for the purpose of paying the 1980 payment on the Allred contract. 
There is absolutely no question at all about that fact. Whether the funds 
were paid by Paul Richins mistakenly or by his father to Paul and then to 
the Court makes no difference. 
REPLY TO ARGUMENT VI 
"The initial 'Order to Compel Deposit' signed by Judge J. 
Duffy Palmer (R. 234) required Richtron and Paul Richins to deposit $10,431 
into Court, representing the 1980 payment on the Allred contract, to be held 
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'PENDING THE DETERMINATION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES IN THE ALLRED CONTRACT 
AND THE PROPERTIES UNDERLYING SAID CONTRACT.r" (p. 39 of Brief of Intervenor.) 
The Court determined the rights of the parties in the Allred contract. The 
Court determined that the Young Farms Limited, the limited partnership, had 
the right, upon the payment of the delinquent payments, of which the 1980 
$10,431 was one, to be put in the place of defendant Richtron, Inc. as the 
purchaser of the property covered by the Allred contract. The Court made 
the determination that the defendants Paul Richins and Richtron, Inc. had 
no interest in that property. There can be no other interpretation of the 
results of this lawsuit. The Court's ruling that the Court would go in back 
of the initial deposit to determine where the money came from and award the 
money to that party, Mr. Leo Richins, who is not a party to the lawsuit, is 
in error and that error should be cured by this appeal. 
REPLY TO ARGUMENTS VII AND VIII 
In reply to arguments VII and VIII, it makes no difference why 
Leo Richins deposited the Letter of Credit. The Letter of Credit was the same 
as cash and no consideration was required for it. It was deposited for the 
purpose of paying the 1980 payment on the Allred contract. The fact that it 
was contributed by Mr. Leo Richins does not make it his property. It was 
deposited to replace a payment that was made by the defendant Richtron, Inc. 
on behalf of and with the funds that should have been from the plaintiff 
limited partnership. The question of where cash comes from to make a payment 
required by the Court under the contract is immaterial. This Court should 
look at what the purpose was for which the money was deposited. It was 
deposited, without question, as the 1980 payment on the Allred contract 
covering the limited partnership's real property. 
CONCLUSION 
The $10,431 was to be the 1980 payment. It was paid by 
the limited partnership to the general partner for that purpose and it 
was later required that the limited partnership pay it again in order to 
maintain its property rights. The limited partnership should have the right 
to recover this payment. 
DATED this 16th day of January, 1985. 
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